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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Caspers' Statement of Facts, adopted by Wrights, focuses on 
the propriety of the defendants' actions, and cites the facts most 
favorable to the defendants. The truth of those claims is not at 
issue at this stage of the litigation. "[S]tanding in no way 
depends on the merits" of the case. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
500 (1975) . "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept 
as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must 
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Id. , 
422 U.S. at 501. 
Defendants particularly emphasize their claim that all 
necessary authorizations for the plat change were obtained before 
Triesaults purchased their lot. (Caspers' brief 4-5.) The 
complaint alleges, however, that those authorizations, at least in 
the case of Bakers, were obtained by misrepresentations and other 
misconduct by Caspers and Wrights. (Amended Complaint ff 3 0.e, 35, 
37 (R. 722-21), copy attached to plaintiffs/ initial brief.) 
Wrights charge that plaintiffs have mischaracterized George 
Wright's statements regarding funds from the sale of the new lot, 
and now claim that he said only part of the proceeds would be used 
for the benefit of the PUD. (Wrights' brief 8.) Wrights' brief 
cites to George Wright's deposition testimony. The complaint, 
however, alleges that "the proceeds" (i.e., all the proceeds) from 
the sale would be used for the PUD. (R. 725.) Even if Wright's 
testimony were controlling, plaintiffs would still have a valid 
claim, for Wright admitted that he did not perform all the 
landscaping he agreed to do in exchange for the sale of the lot. 
(R. 164-63.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF PRESERVED THEIR 
CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL DAMAGES. 
Wrights assert that Triesaults' personal claims against George 
Wright relating to "picking cherries, Forest Service boundaries, 
storage buildings, and the access road . . . were not preserved on 
appeal or addressed in Appellants' brief." (Wrights' brief 11.) 
This statement is just plain wrong. Point I of Triesaults' brief 
focuses on those very claims. The paragraph of the complaint con-
taining those allegations was quoted on page 12 of Triesaults' 
brief. 
POINT II: PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING. 
A. Plaintiffs7 interests were adverse to defendants. 
Kennecott Corp. V. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985), 
states two requirements for standing: "that (1) the interests of 
the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a 
legally protectible interest in the controversy." 702 P.2d at 454. 
The evident purpose of the first requirement is to prevent 
collusive suits. There must be a genuine controversy. In an 
effort to show that this element is not satisfied, however, Caspers 
argue the merits of the case. Caspers appear to assert that 
plaintiffs did not have an adverse interest because plaintiffs 
would lose. As stated above, "standing in no way depends on the 
merits" of the case. Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).* 
The allegations of the complaint establish that adversity exists. 
In addition, a review of Caspers' argument reveals a misunder-
standing of the issue before this Court. This case was decided by 
summary judgment solely on standing. The merits of the case have 
never been properly before the trial court for resolution. It is 
therefore improper to argue that Triesaults should have realized 
there was going to be a change in the plat, or that Wright was 
acting on his own and not as an officer of QMF. These are issues 
1Warth was cited approvingly by the Utah Supreme Court in Jenkins 
v. Swan, 675 P.2d 145, 1149 (Utah 1983). 
which may arise at trial, but their resolution is not important at 
this stage of the litigation. Plaintiffs alleged that Wright was 
acting on behalf of QMF and Casper. (E.g., Amended Complaint f 14 
(R. 727) .) That allegation must be accepted as true by this Court. 
B. Plaintiffs have a legally protectible interest. 
Defendants argue that only the executive committee would have 
standing to assert claims on behalf of the homeowners. (Caspers' 
brief 12.) This argument ignores (1) the fact that certain of 
plaintiffs' claims could not have been raised by the executive 
committee and (2) the principle that the existence of standing in 
the executive committee does not preclude individual homeowners 
from having standing. 
Bakers' claim, that Bakers approval of the amended plat was 
induced by Wright's false representations to Bakers, is a claim 
that only Bakers could bring. Similarly, only Triesaults had 
standing to pursue their claim that Wright fraudulently induced 
Triesaults' signatures on a quit claim deed. Plaintiffs, and only 
plaintiffs, had standing to bring these claims. 
The authority granted to the executive committee did not 
preclude plaintiffs from acting. The PUD agreement does state that 
the executive committee "shall" conduct the business of the 
association, but that does not preclude individuals from also 
acting to protect their own interests. The term as used in the PUD 
agreement is permissive: it grants authority to the executive 
committee to act. Nothing in the PUD agreement precludes in-
dividuals from also acting where such individuals have a sufficient 
personal interest. See Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board, 652 
P.2d 1332, 1342 (Utah 1982) (Crockett, J., concurring) (provision 
that attorney general "shall" be the legal advisor of state 
officers was permissive, not mandatory) ; Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 
Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831, 836-37 (1939) (statute providing that beer 
advertising "shall be permitted under such regulation as the 
commission may make" was permissive, not mandatory). 
The court in Brickyard Homeowners/ Assoc. Mctmt Comm. v. 
Gibbons Realty Co. . 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983), held that the statute 
under consideration there granted standing to the management 
committee "without limiting the rights of any unit owner to 
initiate suit on his own behalf." 668 P. 2d at 538. The same 
result should obtain here. Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their 
claims because plaintiffs' interests were adverse to defendants, 
and plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest in the contro-
versy. 
POINT III: PLAINTIFFS' MINORITY POSITION DOES 
NOT DEFEAT THEIR CLAIM. 
Point III of plaintiffs' initial brief, Point III of Caspers' 
brief, and Point IV of Wrights' brief discuss whether there was a 
proper vote of the homeowners. To properly evaluate this issue, it 
is important to review how it arose. 
"Mapleton City required QMF, Inc. to obtain authorization of 
all the lot owners in order to change the plat." (Caspers' brief 
at 4, citing R. 505; emphasis added.) Later, "the title company 
requested that all lot owners sign a quit-claim deed conveying 
property to QMF, Inc. so the amended plat could be reconveyed in a 
proper manner to all of the lot owners." (Caspers7 brief at 5, 
citing R. 439; emphasis added.) Bakers signed the initial 
authorization given to Mapleton City, and Triesaults and Bakers 
signed the quit claim deed given to the title company. Plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges those signatures were obtained by fraud. 
As a claimed defense to plaintiffs7 lawsuit, defendants argued 
that any fraud was harmless because plaintiffs7 signatures were not 
necessary—the owners of the eight other lots all supported George 
Wright7s actions. The PUD agreement and the condominium statutes 
each require only a three-quarter majority for plat amendments. 
Eight lots is greater than a three-quarter majority; therefore, 
argue defendants, the plat could have been changed without 
plaintiffs7 consent and any fraud in inducing that consent was 
harmless. 
The trial court adopted defendants7 argument. The court 
stated: 
Although no official vote was taken, the Court 
received affidavits from eight of the ten 
property owners . . . . This Court finds 
that, because at least three-fourths of the 
property owners agreed to the property dis-
posal, the Court accepts the affidavits as 
affirmative votes which effectively bind all 
property owners, including the Plaintiffs. 
(R. 901.) 
To challenge this "finding" of the trial court, plaintiffs 
argued in their brief that "votes" can only be taken in a meeting. 
Caspers now claim this argument was not timely raised. It was 
Caspers, however, who raised the argument below. Plaintiffs were 
not required to "raise" the argument. In any event, the trial 
court's decision shows that plaintiffs' arguments were made and 
considered by the court below. 
The discussion about votes is, however, a red herring. 
Plaintiffs made the argument only to respond to the trial court's 
decision. The real issue before this Court is standing, not the 
merits of the lawsuit per se. Regardless of whether Mapleton City 
or the title company needed to require approval by all lot owners, 
the fact is the city and title company did require such unanimous 
approval. Plaintiffs have alleged fraudulent procurement of their 
signatures. This Court is required to accept that allegation as 
true. Plaintiffs, and only plaintiffs, clearly have standing to 
pursue those claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs had standing, both for private wrongs and for 
wrongs to all homeowners in the PUD. Plaintiffs did not waive 
their claims. The dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint should be 
reversed. 
DATED this ^ ^ "^ day of December, 1997. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:/ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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